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THE ONCE AND FUTURE PROPERTY TAX: 
A DIALOGUE WITH MY YOUNGER SELF 
Edward A. Zelinsky* 
INTRODUCTION 
I am not quite sure when I finally evolved from a brash young 
law professor into an irascible middle aged law professor, but I do 
not doubt that the evolution is now complete. As I look back on 
my youth (expansively defined as the first forty years of my life), I 
now realize that, when younger, I was blessed in many ways, some 
obvious, some less so. One of the less evident bounties of my 
youth was that, in my twenties, I was granted the perfect enemy: 
the local real property tax. 
My life in New Haven in the mid-1970s revolved around tour 
places; the law school, the graduate school of econonucs. New 
Haven City Hall, and my home. At all four locations, the 
municipal property tax was a dragon to be slain. In the legal 
world, the 1970s witnessed a burgeoning determination to displace 
the local property tax as the prime funding source for public 
education and to supplant local property tax revenue with 
expanded state financing, bankrolled by income and/or sales tax 
proceeds. At the economics department, the property tax fared as 
poorly—a regressive, inadministrable and inelastic levy, a relic of a 
bygone era doomed to extinction. I was then an alderman of the 
City of New Haven and, when I went to City Hall to work on 
budgetary matters, it was clear to all that municipal property taxes 
could no longer serve as an important revenue source for urban 
centers like New Haven. Indeed, New Haven—an older, 
"inelastic"' city then experiencing what we came to call 
* Edward A. Zelinsky is professor of law at the Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law 
of Yeshiva University. For helpful suggestions, he thanks Professors Robert Ellickson md 
Evelyn Brody as well as Doris Zelinsky, whose professional focus has shifted from public 
finance but who remains em acute critic of her husband's foibles. 
A modified version of the Section II of this article appeared in an Urban Institute 
book edited by Professor Brody, see THE PROPERTY-TAX EXEMPTION FOR CHARITIES; 
MAPPING THE BATTLEFIELD 369 (Evelyn Brody ed., 2002). , C T-, 
• The concept of municipal inelasticity was developed by David Rusk. See DAVID 
RUSK, CITIES WITHOUT SUBURBS (1993). 
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"deindustrialization,"—seemed to be a perfect example of the 
flaws of the local real property tax: its tax base stagnant; its prime 
locations occupied by tax-exempt institutions; surrounded by 
suburbs, some of which were (and still are) among the nation's 
most affluent communities. 
Even when I went home, the evils of the property tax were 
paramount: My wife, then a staff economist for Connecticut's 
association of mayors, was in the front lines fighting for property 
tax reform. On more than one occasion, pillow talk was about 
different formulas for allocating state assistance to central cities. 
In short, everywhere I went, the local real property tax was 
perceived as both bad and doomed. 
If I could speak with that brash young law student/graduate 
student/alderman, he would undoubtedly tell me, with great 
confidence, that by the beginning of the next century (which then 
seemed very far away) the property tax would no longer play a 
role in the system of local public finance. True, he would have 
opined, some important issues remained for the transition period 
to a property taxless world, e.g., payments-in-lieu-of-taxes 
(PILOTS) to central cities as long as they remained dependent on 
property tax revenues. But for the long run, the intellectual, 
political, and legal assault on local property taxation would lead to 
the tax's demise. 
Alas, he was wrong. 
Today, even the most casual observer of local finance 
understands that the property tax continues to play a critical role 
funding municipal services, particularly public education.^ Among 
the cognoscenti of local finance, the continuing centrality of the 
property tax is, if anything, even more widely acknowledged.^ 
This essay explains why the young man I once was, confident 
of the imminent demise of the property tax, was wrong. This is 
thus a dialogue with my younger self for, as I look back, it is clear 
that much of the critique of the local property tax to which I (and 
2 Property taxes remain a major political issue throughout the nation. See David M. 
Halbfinger, Franks Proposes an Overhaul of New Jersey's Property Taxes, N.Y. TIMES, 
Jtme 22, 2001, at B4; Dirk Johnson & Kevin Peraino, Ventura's Shutdown Smackdown, 
NEWSWEEK, July 9, 2001, at 32 (discussing Mirmesota Governor Ventura's program for 
increased state educational assistance and lower property taxes). 
3 Legal scholars and public finance economists today devote significant attention to 
the legal and policy issues posed by the local property tax. See William A. Fischel, 
Homevoters, Municipal Corporate Governance, and the Benefit View of the Property Tax, 
54 NAT'L TAX J. 157 (2001); John A. Swain, The Taxation of Private Interests in Public 
Property: Toward a Unified Theory of Property Taxation, 2000 UTAH L. REV. 421; George 
R. Zodrow, The Property Tax As a Capital Tax: A Room with Three Views, 54 NAT'L TAX 
J. 139 (2001). 
2002] T H E  O N C E  A N D  F U T U R E  P R O P E R T Y  T A X  2201 
others) adhered was overstated. As we enter the new century, the 
local property tax survives for many reasons; chief among these is 
that the tax has distinct theoretical and practical advantages. 
This is not to say that the standard local property tax is 
perfect or incapable of practical improvement; not everything I 
believed in my youth was wrong. But reality is indeed more 
complex than I and others thought: We overestimated the 
problems of the local property tax and underestimated the tax's 
virtues. We did not foresee the extent to which modifications of 
the tax and alternative revenue sources for localities would prove 
to be, not initial steps toward the abolition of the local property 
tax, but, rather, ameliorative reforms which would enable the real 
property tax to survive. We similarly underappreciated the need 
for robust local government to possess its own tax base and how 
well-adapted the local property tax is for financing genuinely local 
expenditures. We subscribed to overly-idealized notions of sales 
and income tax bases, forcing (in our minds, at least) the realities 
of the property tax into an inherently unwinnable competition with 
theoretically perfect alternatives for financing public services. The 
choices in the real world proved more difficult. 
I. THE INDICTMENT AND PARTIAL 
ACQUITTAL OF THE PROPERTY TAX 
In retrospect, the intellectual critique of the local property tax 
to which I and others adhered seems overly-simplistic; at the time, 
it seemed compelling. The critique rested on five premises. First, 
we confidently believed, the local property tax is invariably 
regressive. The economic incidence of the tax, this argument goes, 
falls heavily—and unfairly—on homeowners (who pay property 
taxes directly) and tenants (who pay such taxes indirectly via 
higher rents); since housing costs absorb greater percentages of the 
budgets of low- and middle-income families, property taxes 
disproportionately impact those budgets; because affluent families 
save greater percentages of their incomes and spend 
proportionately less of their incomes on housing, such families 
devote smaller percentages of their incomes to local property taxes 
than do low- and middle-income households. 
Second, the critique continued, the property tax imposes its 
burden irrespective of the taxpayer's liquidity vel non. The classic 
example is the retiree hving on a fixed income whose home 
appreciates significantly in value and whose local property tax 
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obligation rises commensurately. Since the retiree's income is 
static, rising property taxes absorb increasingly large percentages 
of that income, creating liquidity problems for the fixed-income 
retiree. 
Third, from the perspective of the municipal fisc, the real 
property tax base is inelastic, increasing less rapidly than other tax 
bases, most notably income. Under the classic, progressive income 
tax (unindexed for inflation), government revenues grow more 
rapidly than income itself since economic growth and inflation 
push taxpayers into higher marginal brackets. Even when 
progressive income taxes are automatically inflation-adjusted, 
government revenues in times of economic growth expand faster 
under such taxes than does income itself as increasingly 
prosperous taxpayers climb into higher brackets.'' 
In contrast, under the classic real property tax—^with a single, 
fixed rate of tax—^revenues rise less rapidly than income (even 
with accurate annual property valuations) since, in a modem 
economy, a lower percentage of new economic growth accrues to 
real estate and a correspondingly higher percentage of such growth 
accmes to services and intangible property, outside the scope of 
the real property levy. The inelasticity of the local property tax is 
in practice compounded by delays in assessing property values and 
by inaccuracies once those assessments are made; applying fixed 
tax rates to old and inaccurate assessments yields static revenues. 
Fourth, the local property tax, the critique continued, is unfair 
because of its local nature. This argument was particularly well-
developed in the context of litigation challenging the use of local 
property taxes to finance public education.' The contention 
advanced in that litigation and in much of the relevant scholarly 
literature' was that children residing in communities with hmited 
* See, e.g., Becky Trout, League Says Municipal Finances Look Good; Reliance on 
Property Taxes Throttles Cities, BNA DAILY TAX REP., July 2, 1999, at H-1 (quoting 
Donald J. Borut, executive director of the National League of Cities; "Not only is the 
property tax much less influenced by economic activity than the income or sales tax, the 
very nature of economic activity is also moving away from the traditional linkage of 
tangible property to economic production and growth."); Doug Sheppard, City Survey: 
The Good, The Bad, and the Semigood, TAX ANALYSTS, TAX NOTES TODAY, July 2, 
1999, at 127-11 ("Municipal property tax revenues, in fact, increased only 3.9 percent in 
1998, compared with increases of 6.5 percent and 6.8 percent in income tax and sales tax 
revenues, respectively."). 
5 Among the most recent decisions in the decades-long saga of this litigation are 
Stowe Citizens for Responsible Government v. Vermont, 730 A.2d 573 (Vt. 1999); 
Anderson v. Vermont, 723 A.2d 1147 (Vt. 1998); Brigham v. Vermont, 692 A.2d 3M 
(1997); and Claremont Sch. Dist. v. Governor, 703 A.2d 1353 (1997). 
^ A good summary of this literature, as well as a perceptive analysis of the voluminous 
case law, are to be found in Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part I B The Structure of 
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property tax bases face poorer educational systems than children 
hving in localities with more ample property tax revenue. While 
the proponents of school finance reform were generally careful to 
eschew explicit claims that such reform would improve the 
scholastic performance of disadvantaged students, the implicit 
promise of their efforts was clear: substituting more generous state 
school financing for inadequate local funds would improve 
educational results. 
Moreover, the critique of the local nature of the local 
property tax readily generalizes to municipal services other than 
education: Residents of communities with less property tax 
resources can less easily finance adequate public services than can 
residents of localities with abundant property tax bases. 
Finally, the ad valorem nature of the real property tax, 
whatever its theoretical appeal, is in practice hard to implement. 
Absent actual sales, it is difficult and resource-consuming to 
appraise much valuable real estate, e.g., unique homes, special 
purpose industrial and commercial structures. Moreover, the 
appraisal process has historically been subject to considerable 
political manipulation, not the least because of the difficulties of 
determining fair market values absent sale transactions. 
As compelhng as these arguments may have seemed to me 
and others in the 1970s, a generation later, much (though not all) 
of this critique requires significant qualification while other parts 
of this critique look just plain wrong. 
Chief among the intellectual developments challenging this 
critique of the local property tax are two alternative claims now 
widely accepted by students of property taxation: that the property 
tax is, as an economic matter, a tax on capital income generally 
and that the property tax essentially purchases benefits received 
from municipal government.' In the first case, the tax is 
progressive in its economic incidence; in the second case, the tax 
Local Government Law, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1,23-24 (1990). 
^ See Fischel, supra note 3; Therese J. McGuire, Federal Aid to States and Localities 
and the Appropriate Competitive Framework, in COMPETITION AMONG STATES AND 
LOCAL GOVERNMENTS 153,158 (Daphne A. Kenyon & John Kincaid eds., 1991) ("[Tjhe 
primary source of local raised revenue is property taxes, a tax often thought of as a benefit 
tax."); Thomas J. Nechyba, The Benefit View and the New View, in PROPERTY TAXATION 
AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT FINANCE (2001); Wallace E. Gates & Robert M. Schwab, The 
Allocative and Distributive Implications of Local Fiscal Competition, in COMPETITION 
AMONG STATES AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS, supra, at 127 ("if many local governments 
compete against one another, then all local taxes become benefit taxes"); Zodrow, supra 
note 3; George R. Zodrow, Reflections on the New View and the Benefit View of the 
Property Tax, in PROPERTY TAXATION AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT RNANCE (Wallace 
E. Gates ed., 2001). 
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has no net economic effect since the cost of the tax is offset by the 
benefits the tax purchases. While both views cannot be correct, 
together they erode the once widely-held belief that property 
taxation passes onto the consumers of housing and is thus 
regressive in its ultimate economic effect. 
Central to the characterization of the real property tax as a 
levy on capital income generally is Professor Harberger's model of 
the corporate income tax and his conclusion that the corporate tax 
ultimately falls on all capital, corporate and noncorporate.® For 
purposes of this discussion. Professor Harberger's basic insights 
are that the corporate levy is initially imposed on selective capital 
(i.e., capital invested in corporate solution), that capital for the 
long term is fungible and mobile between the corporate and 
noncorporate portions of the economy, and that the owners of 
corporate capital, to avoid selective taxation, will seek higher 
after-tax returns by shifting their investments from the (taxed) 
corporate sector to the (nontaxed) unincorporated sector. This 
shift of capital, in turn, contracts the corporate sector and expands 
the amount of capital invested noncorporately. The upshot is a 
lower rate of return for all owners of capital as the holders of 
corporate capital are taxed while the owners of noncorporate 
capital receive lower returns since the supply of noncorporate 
capital is increased by the tax-induced movement of resources into 
the unincorporated sector to avoid corporate taxation; the 
consequent increase of the supply of noncorporate capital 
depresses the rate of return to such capital. 
The Harberger model is readily adaptable to the local 
property tax, which, like the corporate income tax, is a selective 
tax on one particular sector of capital investment, i.e., real 
property.' To avoid this selective taxation, mobile capital will 
migrate to nontaxed sectors, i.e., forms of investment other than 
real property. Thus, the property tax turns out to be an impost on 
capital, imposed (directly) on capital held as real property and 
(indirectly) on all other capital, the supply of which is increased by 
the migration of capital avoiding real property'" taxation with an 
attendant decrease in the rate of return to non-real estate capital. 
If the real property levy is conceived in this fashion as 
8 See HARVEY S. ROSEN, PUBLIC FINANCE 294-98 (4th ed. 1995). 
^ Id. at 530-31. 
While remnants of the property tax on intangible and personal property persist in 
some places, in essence, the local property tax is today a tax on real estate. See JEROME 
R. HELLERSTEIN & WALTER HELLERSTEIN, STATE AND LXICAL TAXATION 97 (7th ed. 
2001) (discussing the "long-term process of gradually excluding most personalty and 
intangibles" from property taxation). 
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ultimately burdening capital in general, the distributional 
implications of the tax are more complex than the traditional 
critique suggests. To the extent the property tax is passed onto 
renters and less affluent homeowners, that critique retains force 
since lower- and middle-income families devote higher 
percentages of their budgets to housing costs than do affluent 
households and thus spend (via their rent and mortgage payments) 
higher percentages of their incomes on real property taxation than 
do more prosperous families. 
However, to the extent that the property tax falls on the 
owners of capital generally, the tax is potentially progressive in its 
impact; indeed, the property tax resembles the kind of wealth 
impost favored by certain commentators." The characterization of 
the property tax as a potentially progressive levy on wealth is 
reinforced by the fact that the real property tax, conceived as a tax 
on the users of particular types of capital, falls directly, not just on 
homeowners, but on the holders of commercial and industrial real 
estate as well. 
The alternative challenge to the traditional wisdom, premised 
on the seminal writings of Charles Tiebout, views the property tax 
as a wash: the payment of property taxes purchases offsetting 
benefits in the form of government services.'^ In a Tieboutian 
world, if a particular taxpayer does not desire the package of taxes 
and services offered by the community in which he resides, he will 
change his residence to a locality furnishing a set of taxes and 
services more to his liking. Thus, each individual's property tax 
payments ultimately purchase for him a bundle of local 
government services which, in the individual's judgment, are worth 
the property tax cost. 
Of course, this model is not without its limitations and 
qualifications. In any given metropolitan area, there may not in 
practice be enough municipalities to offer every individual the 
particular package of taxes and services he considers optimal; 
relocation from locality to locality may not be as easy as the 
Tiebout model assumes. 
Nevertheless, with all of the necessary limitations and 
" See, e.g., Bruce Ackerman & Anne Alstott, Your Stake in America, 41 ARIZ. L. 
REV. 249 (19W); Anne L. Alstott, The Uneasy Liberal Case Against Income and Wealth 
Transfer Taxation- A Response to Professor McCaffrey, 51 TAX L. REV. 363 (1996). 
'2 Tiebout's 1956 article is one of the few academic articles which truly deserves to be 
called seminal. See Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. 
ECON. 416 (1956). Indeed, it is difficult to conceive of current legal and economic 
scholarship on public finance without Tiebout's analysis. See Fischel, supra note 3, at 157; 
Zodrow, supra note 3, at 140 ("the renowned Tiebout model of local government"). 
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qualifications, the benefits perspective on the local property tax 
contains an important insight: local property taxes can plausibly be 
characterized as, in large measure, the price paid for a particular 
bundle of government services. To that extent, the tax expended is 
offset by the municipal benefits received. 
A further intellectual trend impugning the critique of the real 
property tax has been renewed interest in the problem of imputed 
income. Historically, the failure of income taxation to reach 
imputed income has been dismissed as a self-evident concession to 
administrative and political considerations. While, as a theoretical 
matter, homeowners receive imputed income from the rental 
values of their houses, the possibility of taxing this imputed income 
had traditionally been dismissed by invoking the practical 
difficulties of determining the amount of such income and by 
noting the unlikelihood that a representative who voted for taxing 
imputed income would be present for the next session of Congress 
to help implement his decision. 
However, the problem of imputed income becomes more 
complicated once one considers the economic effects of excluding 
such income from the income tax base and the possibility that 
indirect taxation might, practically and in politically feasible ways, 
implicitly reach such imputed income. As a matter of economic 
efficiency, the allocation of resources is distorted when cash 
income is taxed but imputed income is not, since taxpayers are 
induced to hold resources in forms which produce (untaxed) 
imputed income rather than (taxed) cash income. Much 
contemporary tax policy literature describes and decries these 
kinds of tax-based economic distortions." 
Indeed, one of the staples today of an introductory law school 
course on the federal income tax is to contrast the tax burden of a 
renter who puts his money in the bank, pays tax on the resulting 
interest, and uses the after-tax cash to pay (nondeductible) rent 
with the lighter income tax burden of a homeowner who invests his 
cash in a house and lives in it, free of imputed rental income." 
This simple comparison is particularly enlightening for my 
students who pay New York City rents. 
However, the real property tax may be characterized as an 
indirect way of reaching the imputed rental value of homes. From 
" See, e.g., JOSEPH M. DODGE ET AL., FEDERAL INCOME TAX: DOCTRINE, 
STRUCTURE, AND POLICY 80 (2d ed. 1999) ("[EJconomists would argue that imputed 
income from consumer assets should be taxed on neutrality grounds: Excluding such 
imputed income creates excessive demand for consumer assets as opposed to savings and 
investments."). 
See id. at 79-80. 
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this perspective, our hypothetical fixed-income retiree has more 
income than he realizes since, in addition to his cash income, he 
receives imputed income from his residence; in simplest terms, his 
home eliminates the need for the retiree to pay rent. The local 
property tax is a way of reaching this imputed income, correcting 
in rough fashion for the failure of the income tax to reach that 
income. If the resulting tax burden stresses the retiree's cash flow, 
that may be an economically appropriate signal that the retiree is 
overconsuming housing by staying in his home. 
To be sure, it is not a politically compelling defense of the 
local property tax that it reaches the imputed rental value of 
homes missed by income taxation and that homeowners' liquidity 
complaints may indicate that they are overhoused. This analysis 
does, however, challenge the critique of the tax to which I and 
others adhered. 
Also undermining that critique has been the academic 
doctrine known as optimal tax theory. For our purposes, the most 
important insights of that theory are that taxes (and, by extension, 
the benefits of government services) are capitalized into the value 
of taxed assets and that a simple static snapshot of current tax 
payments belies the underlying economics of taxation. 
To return to our hypothetical retiree, the stream of 
anticipated property tax payments affected the price of his home 
when he originally bought that home. If, for example, the 
community in which the home is located has an unusually heavy 
tax burden, the retiree paid correspondingly less for his home than 
he would have had the home been located in a lower-taxed 
locality. Similarly, if the community has a particularly good school 
system, the value of the retiree's house is currently greater than it 
otherwise would be; his property tax payments can thus be 
characterized as maintaining the value of his home via the quahty 
of school services. 
Indeed, if the retiree sent his children to the local pubhc 
schools, he was, for those years, effectively subsidized by the 
community's childless families and by commercial and residential 
property owners, since, in the short run, a homeowner's own 
property tax payments rarely cover all the costs of educating his 
children.'^ From this vantage, the retiree's current property taxes 
constitute delayed payment for the educational services he 
received earlier. 
Moreover, the elasticity of a tax base does not appear to be 
Edward A. Zelinsky, The Cities and the Middle Class: Another Look at the Urban 
Crisis, 1975 Wis. L. REV. 1081. 
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the unalloyed virtue today that it once did. As a substantive 
matter, government expenditures provoke greater skepticism 
today than they did a generation ago. Procedurally, even those 
more sanguine about government outlays have grown more 
sensitive to the problems of a public sector on autopilot. There is, 
for example, widespread recognition that entitlement-type 
expenditures can distort public priorities. Public sector 
accountabUity can be enhanced by a tax (like the inelastic property 
levy) which continuously requires elected officials to decide openly 
about the size of public outlays by voting on tax rates. 
In a sluggish economy, the relative inelasticity of property tax 
revenues may appear as something of a virtue as, on the downside, 
receipts from the more cyclical income and sales levies decline 
while the property tax base remains comparatively stable.'® 
In addition, mounting evidence suggests that increased 
funding for public schools has not improved student 
performance." There remain arguments for substantial state 
financing of public schools: In a world of residential mobihty 
among locahties, municipalities tend to underfund education since 
students are unlikely to remain in the community as taxpayers and 
workers, repaying the community for its investment in their 
educations; notions of citizenship imply a basic commitment to 
each child regardless of his or her family's economic circumstances 
or locality; pubhc education has an important redistributive 
component; for practical and theoretical reasons, redistributive 
activity should occur at higher levels of government. From these 
perspectives, state educational funding counteracts communities' 
tendency to underfinance education and guarantees each child his 
or her basic rights to schooling. While I find these arguments 
persuasive, I confess that they lack the emotional punch and 
intellectual clarity of earlier promises that jettisoning property tax-
See Wallace E. Oates, The Theory and Rationale of Local Property Taxation, in 
STATE AND LOCAL FINANCE FOR THE 1990S: A CASE STUDY OF ARIZONA 420 (Therese 
J. McGuire & Dana Wolfe Naimark eds., 1991) ("[PJroperty taxation promises a more 
stable source of local revenues than does a local income tax."); John E. Petersen, Bet on 
the Tortoise, GOVERNING, Apr. 2001, at 72 ("The sustained but gentle growth in property 
values has made the property tax the tortoise in the revenues race."). 
See Eric A. Hanushek, The Economics of Schooling: Production and Efficiency in 
Public Schools, 24 J. ECON. LITERATURE 1141, 1162 (1986) ("There appears to be no 
strong or systematic relationship between school expenditures tmd student 
performance."); Gary Burtless, Introduction to DOES MONEY MATTER?: THE EFFECT OF 
SCHOOL RESOURCES ON STUDENT ACHIEVEMENT AND ADULT SUCCESS 41 (Gary 
Burtless ed., 1996) ("Statistical evidence tmd recent historical experience suggest to me 
that school performance is unlikely to be improved solely by investing extra money in the 
nation's schools."). 
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financed public education would improve educational 
performance. 
Finally, the unstated premise of the critique embraced by my 
younger self was that competing tax bases—the income and sales 
taxes—^were obviously preferable to the real property levy as 
means of financing public services. To contemporary eyes, this is 
perhaps the most naive part of the critique, an overidealized 
notion of the alternatives to property taxation. Much of the 
output of the tax policy community over the last generation has 
documented the theoretical and practical limitations of the income 
tax.'® Important voices similarly suggest that the viability of the 
sales tax is threatened both by the reluctance of legislatures to 
extend sales taxation to general services" and by the 
administrative problem of collecting the sales tax in a world of 
mail order and electronic commerce. 
What, then, is left of the intellectual critique of the property 
tax which was so central to my younger years? Parts of that 
critique retain force: Concerns about regressivity remain insofar as 
the tax is passed onto tenants or is absorbed by homeowners of 
modest means; concerns about the appraisal process are still well-
founded;^" despite the disappointing gap between increased 
funding and improved student performance, persuasive reasons 
exist for allocating to the states a strong role in financing public 
education. 
In short, the property tax, like any other human institution, if 
compared to a pristine theoretical ideal, will understandably prove 
wanting. However, in a world of imperfect choices, the local 
property tax, with its problems and limitations, is not as bad as the 
critique of my youth suggested and remains a viable revenue 
source for municipal government. 
II. REFORM AS PRESERVATION 
While academics and policy analysts were undermining the 
Much of that critique has been developed under the rubric of tax expenditure 
analysis. See STANLEY S. SURREY & PAUL MCDANIEL, TAX EXPENDITURES (1985). 
" HELLERSTEIN & HELLERSTEIN, supra note 10, at 746-49. 
20 While there are those who contend that modem, computerized appraisal methods 
remedy the deficiencies of the appraisal proeess, I am skeptical of such claims. See 
Edward A. Zelinsky, For Realization: Income Taxation, Sectoral Accretionism, and the 
Virtue of Attainable Virtues, 19 CARDOZO L. REV. 861, 881-82 (1997). However, as I 
discuss infra, the loeal property tax has distinct administrative advantages over alternative 
tax bases because of the visibility of real estate and its fixed situs. 
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critique of the property tax to which I and others ascribed, 
legislators and voters were simultaneously responding to 
taxpayers' loudest complaints about the local property levy. The 
result has been a nationwide expansion of devices which answer 
some of the most politically urgent outcries about the tax. These 
devices fall into three categories:^^ (a) provisions which abate the 
local property taxes of particular kinds of taxpayers (e.g., 
homeowners, the elderly, farmers), (b) general limitations which 
cap the taxes local governments can impose, and (c) increased 
financial assistance to municipal treasuries to offset the need for 
local property tax revenues. 
Among the best known of the devices in the first category is 
the classic homestead exemption, which immunizes from taxation 
a portion of the value of each taxpayer's principal residence, e.g., 
the first $10,000 of the taxpayer's primary home.^^ Since 
commercial and industrial real estate, as well as second homes, do 
not receive equivalent exemption, the burden of the tax shifts 
toward such nonexempted property.^^ 
Equally well known are devices, variously denoted as 
homestead provisions,^" "circuitbreakers,"^^ or income tax credits,^® 
21 In theory, there is a fourth category of devices that have abated the pinch of the real 
property tax, i.e., market-based arrangements such as so-called "reverse mortgages," 
which permit older persons to borrow incrementally against the unrealized appreciation of 
their homes. However, in practice, such market-based devices have not played a 
significant role in alleviating discontent with the property tax. 
22 See W. VA. CONST, art. X, sec. lb, subsec. C (authorizing the legislature to adopt an 
exemption up to $20,000 for real property "used exclusively for residential purposes" by 
nonelderly, nondisabled homeowners); FCA. STAT. ANN. § 196.031(1) (West 1999) 
(granting "[e]very person" an "exemption from all taxation" of the first $5,000 of "his or 
her permanent residence"); TEX. TAX CODE § 11.13(a), (b) (Vernon 1992) (providing all 
"adult[s]" with a basic "exemption from taxation" for county and school district property 
taxes for the adult's "residence homestead"). 
Tj'pically, states with such general exemptions supplement them with additional or 
more generous exemptions for elderly, disabled and/or low income homeowners. See 
TEX. TAX CODE § 11.13(c) (providing additional exemption from school district taxation 
for residences of the disabled and those aged 65 and older); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 196.031(3) 
(increasing homestead exemptions for homeowners aged 65 and older and for "disabled 
person[s]"); W.VA. CONST, art. X, sec. lb, subsec. C (requiring homestead exemption for 
taxpayers who are 65 or older or who are disabled). 
22 Alan Gireenblatt, The Loathsome Local Levy, GOVERNING, Oct. 2001, at 36-37 
("the simple fact is that many states have put all kinds of brakes in place to assure that 
property-tax bills do not rise as fast as property values. Much residential property-tax 
relief shifts a good deal of the burden from homeowners to commercial and industrial 
property."). 
2^ See 35 111. COMP. STAT. ANN. 200/15-170 (West 1996) (establishing a "Senior 
Citizens Homestead Exemption"); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 132.810(2)(a) (Michie 2001) 
(providing a homestead exemption for persons 65 and older and for disabled 
homeowners); S.C. CODE ANN. § 12-37-250 (Law Co-op. 2000) (homestead exemption for 
taxpayers aged sixty-five and older, "totally and permanently disabled" or "legally blind"). 
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which provide relief for an individual's property tax obligation on 
the basis of the individual's age (typically, sixty-five or older), 
income level,^' or disability. Despite the arguments which belie the 
image of the fixed income retiree squeezed by property taxes—^the 
putative fixed income retiree has substantial imputed income from 
his home; the community may well have educated his children at 
considerable cost; given the inflation-adjusted nature of Social 
Security and many private pensions, the retiree's income is not so 
fixed—^the image of the illiquid, elderly property taxpayer packs 
significant political wallop. Legislatures have, unsurprisingly, 
responded. 
Particularly noteworthy has been the increasing use of state 
income tax systems to bestow property tax relief. Such use allows 
legislators and governors to make clear to the public that they 
(rather than municipal officeholders) are abating the property tax 
burden, since, on an annual basis, the credit is reflected on the 
taxpayer's state income tax return (rather than his local property 
tax bill). One need not accept the premises of public choice theory 
in their starkest form^^ to see the resulting political advantage to 
state officials, in contrast to alternative forms of reducing property 
tax obligations (e.g., state assistance to municipal treasuries) which 
charmel relief through the municipality and thus fail to alert the 
taxpayer that that relief ultimately emanates from the state house, 
not city hall. 
As an administrative matter, such credits have much to 
commend them. The annual return for state income taxes is a 
particularly efficient means of channeling income-based property 
25 See D.C. CODE ANN. § 47-1806.6(a)(2), (3) (2001) (labeling income tax credits for 
property taxes psiid as "circuit breaker[s]"); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 68, § 2802(9) (West 
2001) (designating as a "circuit breaker" Oklahoma's property tax relief provisions for low 
income elderly and disabled homeowners). 
26 See MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 206.520(1) (West 1998) (credits against state income 
taxes for "property taxes on the taxpayer's homestead"); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 44-33-5 (1999) 
(establishing an income tax credit for "property taxes accrued"). 
22 Maryland limits its credit for property taxes by wealth as well as income. See MD. 
CODE ANN., TAX-PROP. § 9-104(i)(l) (2001) ("A property tax credit under this section 
may not be granted to a homeowner whose combined net worth exceeds $200,000 "). 
28 For purposes of this analysis, the critical public choice premise is that officeholders 
advance their political interests by dispensing governmental largesse so as to maximize 
electoral support. In this context, a governor or legislator who allocates state funds to 
reduce local property taxes will want taxpayers to know that he is responsible for their 
reduced property tax obligations. On public choice more generally, see Edward A. 
Zelinsky, James Madison and Public Choice at Gucci Gulch: A Procedural Defense of Tax 
Expenditures and Tax Institutions, 102 YALE L.J. 1165, 1171-72 (1993); Edward A. 
Zelinsky, Unfunded Mandates, Hidden Taxation, and the Tenth Amendment: On Public 
Choice, Public Interest, and Public Services, 46 VAND. L. REV. 1355, 1369-1370 (1993) 
[hereinafter Unfunded Mandates]. 
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tax relief since that return must be filed anyway thus constitutes a 
preexisting device for communicating at low marginal cost the 
availability of property tax relief.^' When the taxpayer files his 
state income tax return, he is, as part of that process, reminded to 
take the credit for property taxes. Moreover, a taxpayer who 
discloses income on that return automatically reveals his income 
level for the purpose of the property tax credit, allowing the credit 
to be calibrated to that income level. 
My younger self viewed the profusion of circuitbreakers, 
homestead exemptions, and income tax credits for property taxes 
paid as important steps in the demise of the property tax. My 
older self sees them as undergirding a different political dynamic: 
By responding to some of the most politically compeUing 
complaints about the property tax, such mechanisms "fix" the tax, 
inoculating it from more radical surgery. 
One could imagine scenarios where progressively higher 
homestead levels or more generous circuitbreakers so decimate 
the property tax base that that base effectively ceases to exist. So 
far, however, the dynamic has been ameliorative: By alleviating 
the burdens of homeowners, these devices have tended to preserve 
the tax from more radical assault, allowing the property tax to play 
a reduced, but still important, role in financing local government. 
Yet another approach has been the classification of different 
types of properties for the purpose of taxing the various categories 
at different rates. At one level, homestead exemptions, tax credits 
and circuitbreakers, available only to homeowners, implicitly serve 
as classification devices, since they target relief to one kind of real 
estate, i.e., principal residences. However, classification schemes 
in their prototypical form explicitly divide all taxed properties into 
a variety of different categories, each with its own effective tax 
rate.^° Not surprisingly, the politically-sensitive categories— 
owner-occupied homes, the homes of the disabled, farm land— 
tend to receive the most lenient treatment under such classification 
schemes. 
Classification schemes raise important issues of 
administrability. As the number of categories multiplies, the 
problems of pigeonholing particular properties become more 
pronounced. Moreover, under such arrangements, political 
See Edward A. Zelinsky, Efficiency and Income Taxes: The Rehabilitation of Tax 
Incentives, 64 TEX. L. REV. 973,1010 (1986). 
30 See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 273.13 (West 1999); see also John H. Bowman, Real 
Property Classification, in STATE AND LOCAL FINANCE FOR THE 1990S: A CASE STUDY 
OF ARIZONA 426-429, supra note 16. 
2002] THE ONCE AND FUTURE PROPERTY TAX 2213 
pressure mounts, both to create more categories and to manipulate 
the categorization of specific properties.^' At a more theoretical 
level, broad classification schemes (even more so than narrowly-
focused circuitbreakers, homestead exemptions, and property tax 
credits) violate the basic premise of ad valorem property taxation, 
i.e., that tax burdens should be allocated in accordance with fair 
market value. Under the prototypical classification scheme,^^ two 
adjacent properties, with identical fair market values, may have 
significantly different tax obligations because they fall into 
different classifications.^^ 
Even in states without general classification schemes, one 
form of property is often singled out generically for more lenient 
taxation: farm land, frequently taxed on less than its fair market 
value.^ The defense of such favorable treatment typically invokes 
the image of a family farm on the cusp of suburban development. 
If that farm is appraised and taxed at fair market value, i.e., as land 
subdivided for housing, the family will be forced to sell the farm to 
pay its property taxes. By taxing the farm more lightly, the 
argument goes, the family can continue its agricultural lifestyle. 
Special tax treatment for farm land appeals to the most basic 
See, e.g., Maud Naroll, Nevada Lawmakers Approve Third Property Tax Category, 
STATE TAX TODAY, July 5,2001, at 129-17 ("Nevada lawmakers have passed a resolution 
to put another property tax category in the state constitution."). 
California's Proposition 13 can be understood, in part, as a classification scheme 
which categorizes property by the year in which it was acquired by the taxpayer. As has 
been widely noted, this frequently results in substantially identical properties being taxed 
at radically different levels because the earlier acquired property is essentially assessed at 
its historical acquisition cost while the more recently purchased property is assessed more 
closely to its fair market value. See, e.g., Terri A. Sexton et al.. Proposition 13: Unintended 
Effects and Feasible Reforms, 52 NAT'L TAX J. 99 (1999). 
Municipalities frequently engage in a form of classification by abating, permanently 
or temporarily, the property tax liabilities of newly-constructed projects. See, e.g., Joan M. 
Youngman, Property, Taxes, and the Future of Property Taxes, in TUE FXJTURE OF STATE 
TAXATION 123 (David Brunori ed., 1998) (discussing "widespread use of tax incentives for 
business location and expansion."). 
Such abatements are designed to attract economic development which allegedly 
would otherwise not occur within the locality. While these kinds of development-
attracting property tax abatements raise important issues, they are not central to my 
analysis here, which focuses upon property tax devices aimed at mollifying popular 
objection to such taxation. Indeed, economic development abatements are often 
politically contentious as homeowners and small business people resent the perception 
that they are paying higher taxes than large (often, out-of-town) developers and 
corporations. 
3^ See ALASKA STAT. § 29.45.060(a) (Michie 2000) (providing that, for municipal 
property taxes, farm land "shall be assessed on the basis of full and true value for farm use 
and may not be assessed as if subdivided or used for some other nonfarm purpose"); OR. 
REV. STAT. § 308.370(1) (1992) (providing that farm land shall "be valued at its value for 
farm use and not at the real market value it would have if applied to other than farm 
use"). 
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cultural iconography of American life, as well as to eontemporary 
concerns about suburban sprawl and open land. For present 
purposes, however, classifying farm land for more favorable 
property tax treatment reconciles a distinct, well-organized 
group—^farmers—^to the continuance of real property taxation. 
In contrast to devices whieh abate the taxes of particular 
taxpayers and properties, a second type of provision imposes 
general limitations on localities' ability to tax. The best known of 
these limitations is California's Proposition 13 which, inter alia, 
generally precludes municipalities from taxing more than one 
percent of a property's assessed value. Proposition 13 spawned a 
host of similar property tax hmitations throughout the country.^^ 
Even in those states where such limitations were not adopted. 
Proposition 13 created a chmate which increased the (already 
great) sensitivity of munieipal officials to the political perils of 
raising property tax rates. 
My younger self viewed Proposition 13 as validating the belief 
that the property tax was doomed to extinction. In retrospect, the 
reality has, again, been more complex: Proposition 13 and its 
progeny, by capping locally-derived property tax revenues, have 
generally afforded sufficient relief from property taxation to 
preempt further efforts to abolish such taxation. 
A third practical reason that local property taxation has 
survived, despite the expectations of my youth, has been the 
growth of alternative revenues for municipal treasuries, revenues 
which have mitigated the need to raise funds from the property tax 
and have correspondingly reduced the rehance of localities on 
property tax dollars. In part, the growth of alternative revenues 
has taken the form of increased state aid to localities, filling the 
financial gaps left by Proposition 13 and its progeny. In part, this 
growth has taken the form of state assistance for public school 
systems in response to state judicial determinations that 
educational funding overly-reliant on local property tax revenues 
is constitutionally defective.^® Municipally-imposed user fees 
constitute yet another expanding source of nonproperty tax 
revenues for localities in the wake of property tax hmitations.^' 
A particularly notable source of nonproperty tax revenue for 
35 See Steven M. Sheffrin, The Future of the Property Tax: A Political Economy 
Perspective, in THE FUTURE OF STATE TAXATION, supra note 33, at 134; Alvin D. 
Sokolow, The Changing Property Tax and State-Local Relations, 28 PUBLIUS 165, 171 
(1998) ("[T]he property-tax limitations enacted after 1970 restrict local government 
finances much more severely than the measures adopted earlier."). 
3® See Sokolow, supra note 35, at 171. 
33 See Sheffrin, supra note 35, at 135. 
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localities has been expanded payments-in-lieu-of-taxes (PILOT). 
PILOT payments come in a variety of configurations. In one 
version of PILOT, a higher level of government that owns 
property reimburses from its general revenues the lower level 
jurisdictions in which such property is located for some or all of 
the taxes such property would yield if taxable. Thus, for example, 
the federal government in a variety of instances reimburses states 
and locaUties for taxes such jurisdictions would otherwise receive 
from federally-owned land.^® Many states^" similarly compensate 
municipahties for state-owned (i.e., tax-exempt) properties within 
the borders of such municipalities. In yet other versions of PILOT 
payments, states reimburse localities for properties owned by 
governmental instrumentalities.'^ In still other variations of 
PILOT programs, such instrumentalities (e.g., publicly-owed 
utilities, housing authorities, airport commissions) are directed or 
authorized to make payments from their own operating revenues 
to localities in lieu of taxes."*' At least two states (Connecticut and 
Rhode Island) make PILOT payments from general revenues to 
reimburse municipalities for the presence of certain private, 
nonprofit institutions within the municipalities' boundaries."^ 
In another version of PILOT payments, such payments come 
to the locality by agreement between the locality and a private tax-
exempt entity, which sends a check to the municipal fisc while the 
entity retains its exempt status. While these PILOT payments are 
nominally voluntary outlays by the exempt institution, the political 
^ See, e.g., 31 U.S.C. § 6902(a)(1) (1994) ("The Secretary of the Interior shall make a 
payment for each fiscal year to each unit of general local government in which entitlement 
iand is located "). 
See COLO. CONST, art. XXVII, § 10 (State land acquired pursuant to Great 
Outdoors Colorado Program "shall be subject to payments in lieu of taxes to counties in 
which said acquisitions are made."); CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 4654 (West 2001) ("There 
shall be paid to each county in which lands acquired for state forest purposes are 
situated... an amount equivalent to taxes levied by the county on similar land similarly 
situated in the county "); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 58, § 17 (2001) (payments in 
lieu of taxes to towns in which certain state-owned institutions are located). 
"0 See, e.g., IOWA CODE § 463A.4 (West 1997) ("The state shall make payments in lieu 
of taxes to compensate for the loss of tax revenues occasioned by the fact that property is 
owned by the upper Mississippi riverway commission, and thereby exempt from taxation 
by subdivisions of this state."). 
See IND. CODE ANN. § 36-3-2-10 (Michie 2000) (providing for PILOT payments 
from "public entities" such as airport authorities and wastewater treatment facilities); KY. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 58.580 (Michie 1997) (Churchill Downs Authority required to make 
PILOT payments in "an amount equal to the local property taxes Churchill Downs would 
have paid under private ownership"); MD. CODE ANN., TRANSP. § 6-411 (2001) 
(Administration of the Port of Baltimore required to make PILOT payments "to the 
Mayor and City Coimcil of Baltimore" for certain properties). 
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 12-20a (West 2000); R.I. GEN. LAWS. § 45-13-5.1 (1999). 
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reality is usually more complex as the municipality brandishes any 
number of potential sanctions to induce the PILOT payment.'*^ 
These sanctions range from the municipality marshaling public 
opinion against the exempt entity if it declines to make PILOT 
pajmients to the denial of zoning relief or building permits desired 
by the tax-exempt entity to, in the extreme case, the municipality's 
threat to seek political or judicial revocation of the entity's tax-
exempt status. 
In practice, it is typically in everyone's interest to compromise 
on a "voluntary" PILOT payment which is often less than the full 
taxes that would be paid on loss of exempt status, but which, from 
the municipality's perspective, provides immediate financial 
succor.'*'' 
In short, just as the theoretical critique of the local property 
tax to which my younger self adhered was undermined 
intellectually, in practical terms a variety of measures alleviated 
many of the most burdensome features of the tax. By responding 
to the most pressing political imperatives, these measures have 
immunized the tax from outright abolition. 
III. THE AFFIRMATIVE VIRTUES OF THE LOCAL PROPERTY TAX 
My younger self would have found it oxymoronic to speak of 
the virtues of the local property tax. To my older, if not wiser, self, 
it seems clear that the persistence of the local property levy is 
attributable to more than inertia: The real property tax is, in many 
respects, well-adapted to the imperatives of local government. 
Robust local government*^ requires its own revenue base. 
Municipalities totally dependent for funding on the state and 
See, e.g., Carey Goldberg, Harvard Deal With Boston Hints at Era Of Harmony, 
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 26,1999, at All ("Not that the city would say, exactly, that it has been 
blocking Harvard since the land-buying ruckus began, ... but Boston wants to complete 
the deal on the [PILOT] payments, and it is 'first things first from the city's perspective.'"); 
see also Youngman, supra note 33, at 120 ("At the local level, cities have exerted increased 
pressure on exempt institutions to initiate or increase payments in lieu of taxes."). 
See, e.g.. Rick Valliere, Medical Center to Retain Tax Exemption, Make Annual 
Payments to City of Lebanon, BNA DAILY TAX REP., 09 DTR H-1 (Jan. 14, 2002); J. 
Cfuistine Harris & Fred Stokeld, City to Grant Property Tax Exemption in Exchange for 
Payments in Lieu of Taxes, 2002 TAX NEWS TODAY, Jan. 14,2002, at 9-3. 
There is, to be sure, an important premise here: the desirability of robust local 
government. For more on this, see Edward A. Zelinsky, Metropolitanism, Progressivism, 
and Race, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 665 (1998) (reviewing David Rusk, CITIES WITHOUT 
SUBURBS (1993); NEAL R. PEIRCE, QTISTATES: HOW URBAN AMERICA CAN PROSPER 
IN A COMPETITIVE WORLD (1993); DAVID L. KIRP ET AL.. OUR TOWN: RACE, HOUSING 
AND THE SOUL OF SUBURBIA (1995)). 
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federal governments cannot exercise a high degree of 
independence. Municipalities sharing a revenue base with the 
state and federal governments are similarly vulnerable to the 
decisions of the higher levels of government which ultimately 
exercise first dibs on that base. In Tieboutian terms,a local 
government must have its own tax rate to signal the price of public 
services provided by that government so that families and firrns 
can evaluate the efficiency and desirability of the government's 
services. 
As the American system of public finance has evolved, real 
property taxation has become the independent revenue source of 
local government. While histo^ has its claims, were we designing 
the American system of public finance ab initio, there are also 
reasons—heavily administrative in nature—which would lead us to 
assign to the property levy the role of the primary municipal tax 
I33.SC 
First, real estate is visible, facilitating collection of the real 
property tax by localities with little administrative sophistication. 
Sales, income and much personal property, tangible and 
intangible, can be hidden from the tax collector, thus necessitating 
more advanced (often intrusive) forms of tax administration. 
Indeed, visibility (or the lack thereof) lies at the core of 
contemporary concerns about the long-term viability of sales taxes 
and about the growth of abusive tax shelters for publicly-traded 
corporations. 
In theory, the sales tax is protected by the use tax: If goods are 
purchased out-of-state without the payment of sales tax in the 
state of purchase, use tax is subsequently due when the as-yet 
untaxed goods are brought home. In practice, most such 
repatriation of untaxed goods is invisible to the tax collector, 
making the use tax impossible to enforce. 
Similarly, corporate tax shelter arrangements are difficult for 
the IRS to monitor. While these arrangements may involve 
hundreds of millions of dollars, the details of these arrangements 
are typically buried in complex corporate tax returns involving 
bilhons of dollars. Not surprisingly, those concerned about 
corporate tax shelters assert the need to induce or require 
corporations to disclose such shelters so they can be more readily 
evaluated by the IRS."*' There is no comparable problem under the 
See Lee A. Sheppard, Slow and Steady Progress on Corporate Tax Shelters, TAX 
ANALYSTS, TAX NEWS TODAY, July 12, 1999, at 132-4; Sindhu G. Hirani, ABA's Tax 
Section Urges Strict Disclosure To Identify Abusive Corporate Tax Shelters, BNA DAILY 
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real property tax. Real property is, as lawyers say, open and 
notorious, faeilitating the eolleetor's task. 
Second, real estate has a fixed and easily determined situs, 
which prevents taxpayers from shifting the tax base to another 
locality to avoid detection. In contrast, the personal property tax 
has largely atrophied in the United States because of the ease with 
which taxpayers can move personalty when the collector comes 
looking for it. 
The situs issue is subtler in the sales and income contexts, but 
still highlights the advantages of fixed situs real estate as a local tax 
base. Sales may involve multiple parties in different localities, e.g., 
a seller in one municipality, a buyer in another, a shipper in yet a 
third. In such cases, identifying in which locality the sale occurs 
for tax purposes is difficult, if not downright metaphysical. The 
practical problems of collecting the sales tax are similarly serious 
in the case of multijurisdietional sales when one locality is entitled 
to tax (e.g., the town of the buyer), but the party most easily 
charged with a withholding obligation (e.g., the seller) is 
elsewhere. 
Similar problems arise in the income tax context in the face of 
income-generating activity which straddles multiple localities, e.g., 
a corporation with facilities in different cities. Allocating income 
to specific localities in such settings is, by definition, arbitrary and 
subject to taxpayer manipulation. 
Moreover, the situs problems of the sales and income tax 
bases are growing greater in an increasingly integrated economy in 
which more economic activity overlaps different locahties. It is 
widely understood that sales tax is today largely uncollectible on 
mail order and internet sales since, under current law, the 
jurisdiction of the purchaser is forbidden to impose a withholding 
obligation on a seller located outside the jurisdiction. One need 
not subscribe to the most expansive forecasts about electronic 
commerce''® and telecommuting'" to agree that the problems of 
TAX REP., Sept. 10,1999, at G-1. 
See, e.g., Trout, supra note 4 (quoting Dontdd J. Borut, executive director of the 
National League of Cities: "The rapid growth of electronic commerce is threatening 
profound impacts on local businesses as well as local revenue systems if Internet shopping 
continues to enjoy a tax shelter that discriminates against local merchants."). Note the 
dilemma in Mr. Borut's position. On the one hand, that position decries the property tax 
as economically inelastic and therefore less desirable than sales and income taxes. On the 
other hand, the predicted expansion of electronic commerce threatens local sales and 
income tax revenues and thus bolsters the comparative virtues of the real property levy. 
See also AUSTAN GOOLSBEE, IN A WORLD WITHOUT BORDERS: THE IMPACT OF TAXES 
ON INTERNET COMMERCE (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 6863, 
1998). 
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siting sales and income are likely to grow in the years ahead. In a 
sense, then, the real property tax, the oldest of taxes, is also the 
newest of taxes with a geographically fixed base in a world of 
increasingly difficult situs issues. 
Finally, real property is universal in the sense that every 
locality has some. In contrast, largely residential communities, 
lacking significant commercial or retail activity, have little in the 
way of sales to tax. 
In short, viable local government as Americans know it 
requires a tax base which is predominantly the localities' which is 
easily allocable by local jurisdiction. The real property tax fits that 
prescription.'" 
Arrayed against these advantages of local real property 
taxation is the great difficulty of determining fair market values for 
real estate absent actual sales of such real estate. Here, the 
critique of my youth retains its force, because appraising much real 
property is time-consuming, fairly subjective and ultimately 
manipulable." 
While the advocates of computer-based appraisal systems 
claim to have solved the appraisal problem, I am skeptical. 
Fundamentally, the appraisal process requires such often 
problematic determinations as the comparability of properties and 
the future income streams predicted for industrial and commercial 
facilities. Larger, computerized databases do not eliminate these 
judgments and, in some respects, make them more difficult, since 
both sides—^the taxpayer and the fisc—can marshal such elaborate 
databases on their behalf." 
For a different perspective, see Robert J. Cline & Thomas S. Neubig, The Sky Is Not 
Falling: Why State and Local Revenues Were Not Significantly Impacted By The Internet in 
1998, STATE TAX TODAY, July 6, 1999, at 128-11 ("Although e-commerce sales are 
growing rapidly and are receiving widespread attention, there is only a small current 
negative impact on sales and use tax collections "). 
See Andrew M. Reidy, Home Work Problems, ABA J., Jan. 2000, at 70 
("Telecommuting has gone mainstream. In 1998, more than 11 million employees in the 
United States worked at home, connected by computer, e-mail and other electronic 
technology, and the number is sure to increase in the coming years."); see also Linda 
Micco, Consultant Predicts Fifiy Percent Rise in Contingent Workers Within Next Decade, 
BNA PENSION & BENEFITS DAILY, Jan. 5, 2000 ("Within 10 years home-based 
employees (will) constitut(e) another one-quarter to one-third of the workforce."). 
5® Professor Fisher summarizes the analysis nicely: "Every parcel of real estate is 
visible, in a fixed location, and even the smallest governmental unit (has) taxable property 
within its jurisdiction." GLENN W. FISHER, THE WORST TAX? A HISTORY OF THE 
PROPERTY TAX IN AMERICA 120 (1996). 
See, e.g.. Ken Dilanian, Many Homes in Philadelphia Region Over- or 
Underassessed, STATE TAX TODAY, Dec. 13,2001, at 240-21. 
I have been intimately involved in two city-wide property tax appraisals in New 
Haven, one as a municipal legislator, the other as a member of the executive branch of the 
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The alternative to ad valorem real estate taxation—^to tax 
properties at their original acquisition costs—eliminates the 
problems of the appraisal process, but at a cost many consider 
unacceptably unfair and inefficient, i.e., the discrepant taxation of 
economically similar properties based on differences in historical 
purchase prices." 
In short, the local real property tax is a sound method of 
financing local expenditures, with flaws comparable to those of 
competing tax bases, i.e., income and sales. 
CONCLUSION 
While the critique of the property tax I embraced in my youth 
was overstated, I am determined, in my middle age, to avoid the 
mirror image of that critique, an overly-sanguine estimation of the 
current condition of local public finance. I agree, for example, 
with those who contend that unfunded mandates distort local 
priorities and constitute an unjustifiable form of hidden taxation, 
hidden in the sense that those imposing such mandates derive the 
political benefits of mandated services, but require local officials to 
levy the taxes to pay for them.'" The proper level of financial 
assistance to municipalities is a permanently contentious issue, 
given the difficulties of identifying and quantifying the 
municipality. The former was conducted in traditional fashion with paper files cind 
typewritten reports; the latter utilized more advanced computerized methods. 
There is no question but that the more advanced technology can be dazzling in its 
effect. A homeowner, skeptical that his house has been appraised properly, is instantly 
confronted with graphic pictures of his home and comparables, on-screen descriptions of 
these properties, and mathematical formulas of value. The data is organized and 
presented more efficiently in computerized form than under the old system, relying on 
paper files and typewritten reports. 
However, as visually impressive as the new technology is, substantively the appraisal 
process still involves the Scime (often questionable) judgments as the old system. See 
Zelinsky, supra note 20, at 881-82 (1997). 
Proposition 13, which essentially shifted California from a traditional ad valorem 
system to taxation based on historical acquisition cost, was designed to roll back property 
tax burdens, not to solve the problems of the appraisal process. However, a by-product of 
that shift is to reduce such problems while imposing often radically different property tax 
burdens on homes of equal market value. See, e.g., Terri A. Sexton et. al.. Proposition 13: 
Unintended Effects and Feasible Reforms, 52 NAT'L TAX J. 99,101 (1999) (In L^s Angeles 
county, "[t]he typical home buyer paid $280,000 for a house in 1991 and paid $2,800 in 
property taxes. In contrast, a homeowner who had owned an identical dwelling since 1975 
paid only $540 in property taxes."). 
^ See Unfunded Mandates, supra note 28; Edward A. Zelinsky, The Unsolved Problem 
of the Unfunded Mandate, 23 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 741 (1997). For a contrary perspective, 
see Julie A. Roin, Reconceptualizing Unfunded Mandates and Other Regulations, 93 Nw. 
U. L. REV. 351 (1999). 
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externalities of local public services and thus determining the level 
of those services which should be paid for by state or federal 
taxpayers benefitting from such externalities. It is similarly 
difficult to agree upon the implicitly redistributional component of 
many municipal activities, most obviously, education, but others— 
such as police services—as well. Absent such agreement, it is 
impossible to definitively resolve how much of such activities 
should be financed by the higher levels of government at which 
redistribution should take place. 
In short, it is not easy to determine what is a genuinely local 
expenditure, properly financed by local property taxes. 
My younger self would have rejected the legitimacy of that 
inquiry: Even after the federal and state governments make proper 
payments to localities for mandated services, services generating 
inteijuridictional benefits and services of an implicitly 
redistributive nature, my younger self would have insisted that the 
remaining cost of bona fide local activity is better financed by 
means of local income and sales taxation. My older self sees the 
benefits of financing that genuinely local activity with local 
property taxes. 
